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CROSS-COMPLAINANTS-RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by Plaintiff real estate broker to 
recover a real estate commission, and an action by Cross-
Complainants for specific performance of an Earnest Money 
Agreement. Each cause of action is against Heath Development 
Company, a corporation. The individual personal Defendants, 
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all of whom were stockholders, were dismissed with prejudice 
pursuant to stipulation at the time of the commencement of 
the trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Trial was held before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor 
sitting without a jury. Judgment was entered against the 
corporate Defendant for a real estate commission; and judgment 
was entered requiring the corporate Defendant, Heath Develop-
ment Company, to specifically perform the Earnest Money Agree-
ment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the judgment of the District 
Court reversed, and the Respondents resist the same. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant Heath Development Company is a Utah 
corporation (hereinafter referred to as "corporation"). The 
corporation's only asset at the time of the suit and for many 
years prior thereto is a piece of real estate on which the 
corporation (for many years) has operated a trailer park at 
937 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The corporation 
is a close family corporation having ten stockholders. All 
officers and directors were stockholders. The Articles of 
Incorporation set the Board of Directors (hereinafter "Board") 
at five, and there were four directors and one vacancy at 
the time of the transaction. There are outstanding ten shares 
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of common stock of which more than 80% was held by the four 
members of the Board each of whom owns at least two shares. 
Of the remaining two shares, five stockholders own approx-
imately two-tenths share each. Over the past ten years the 
corporation had tried to sell the trailer park, its only asset, 
and in the absence of such a sale managed the trailer park 
thereon. During the ten year period, the corporation tried 
to sell the trailer park on many occasions but never received 
a written offer thereon with the exception of the Earnest 
Money Agreement which is the subject matter of this Appeal. 
Article X of the Articles of Incorporation provided in 
the last sentence thereof that "the Board of Directors by 
resolution shall have power to sell, mortgage or otherwise 
dispose of the property of this corporation without the consent, 
ratification or approval of the shareholders." On November 
13, 1973, the corporation entered into an exclusive listing 
agreement with the Plaintiff. That listing agreement was 
signed by individual stockholders holding in excess of 90% of 
the common stock, and in addition thereto Director Essie Heath, 
deceased at the time of trial, signed on behalf of her two 
children and a sister signed on behalf of a brother so that 
the listing agreement purports to show 100% of the stockholders 
signing the same. The members of the family whose names were 
subscribed to the listing agreement by their mother or sister 
subsequently denied having given any authority to such family 
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member. 
The Cross-Complainants herein, Dorothy A. Housley and 
Bonnie J. Brinton, (hereafter "Housley" and "Brinton") were 
and are owners of over 40% of the common stock of the corpor-
ation, and are directors of the corporation. On January 13, 
1974, they, together with Elmer E. Brinton (not a party herein), 
husband of Bonnie J. Brinton, did as purchasers through the 
Plaintiff make an offer in an Earnest Money Agreement to the 
corporation to purchase the trailer park for the sum of 
$250,000.00. A meeting was held at which all four directors 
were in attendance and at which the Earnest Money Offer was 
presented by Mr. Mason Rankin, agent for the Plaintiff. (T. 448) 
The offer was valid for five days following the presentation, 
and this was explained and known by the directors. (T. 468) 
In fact the termsof the offer were gone over at least twice 
(T. 448-450) and the meeting lasted for approximately two hours. 
(T. 390) The offer was accepted and signed by all four directors. 
The informality so generally present in a close family cor-
poration is reflected by the brief minutes of this meeting, 
Exhibit "4", and reads in total as follows: 
"June 13, 1974 Kayfs home. Report that property 
on State Street priced too high - Offer of 
$250,000.00 by Dorothy Housley, Bonnie and Elmer 
Brinton $500.00 Earnest Money & using their stock 
position as down payment. We each signed an 
agreement to sell to Bonnie and Dorothy the property 
of the Pioneer Trailer Court. May 1st subject to 
financing." (Underscored portion is in the hand-
writing of Dorothy Housley) 
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This minute entry was written by Essie Heath in her handwriting, 
except the underscored portion, in a small minute book 
(approximately 4"x7"). The purchase price is clearly set 
forth; the down payment is designated, and it is specified 
that the balance is to be paid on or before May 1st. The 
minutes also reflect a condition precedent, namely, the ob-
taining of financing which was timely obtained through First 
Security Bank of Utah by way of a mortgage loan in the sum of 
$187,000.00, more than sufficient to pay off the balance after 
reducing the purchase price by the value of the stock held 
by Housley and Brinton. The value of the property and the 
financial statements of Mr. and Mrs. Brinton and Housley were 
not sufficient to obtain the loan notwithstanding that the 
loan was a standard commercial loan reflecting 75% of the 
market value of the property. (T.388) Consequently, the bank 
required a co-signer who was obtained. 
Financing was completed on the 9th day of April, 1974, 
and Plaintiff's agent, Rankin, immediately contacted Kathryn 
B. Heath, president and director of the corporation, to obtain 
her signature on the deed and arrange for a closing date on 
the following day, April 10th. Pursuant to an appointment 
made with Mrs. Heath, agent Rankin appeared at her home at 
which time she categorically refused to sign the deed or any 
other papers and stated that she would never sign the necessary 
papers or deed. 
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The value of the common stock was determined in 1969 
or 1970 following the death of Mrs. Housley1s mother. This 
determination was made by the Internal Revenue who set the 
value at $18,000.00 per share for federal and state purposes. 
(T. 471) The Court at the time of trial found the common 
stock, based on the $250,000.00 offer, to be approximately 
$20,000.00 per share. (Finding of Fact #18) 
At pages 5 and 6 of Appellant's Brief, the Appellant 
sets forth two Earnest Money Agreements, Exhibits D-9 and D-10, 
as though they were accepted facts and pertain to this case. 
This is not only misleading but is in error. The Court found 
both of these offers to purchase from Mr. Hugh Wayman inad-
missible on the grounds that they were immaterial. (T. 492 
and T. 521) The Court's denial of admissibility is assigned 
as an error in Point III of Appellant's Brief. 
The Court found in favor of the Plaintiff and granted 
a judgment against the Defendant corporation for $15,000.00 
together with attorney's fees. The Court further ordered 
specific performance on the Cross-Claim of Housley and Brinton 
ordering the corporation to convey the property to Housley 
and Brinton and awarded attorney's fee in the sum of $7,000.00. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 13, 1973, WAS 
SIGNED AND ACCEPTED BY THE CORPORATION AND IS ENFORCEABLE. 
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A close corporation or a family corporation's stock 
is held by relatively few stockholders, and the Board is 
usually composed, as the case is here, completely of share-
holders. Judicially, a family corporation is allowed to 
conduct its corporate business with informality, and the courts 
do not require strict adherence to the corporate law and pro-
cedures as is found in the case of regular or public corporations. 
There is a monolithic body of law applied to publicly 
held corporations including complex security regulation systems 
designed to protect investors. Yet at the same time, courts 
have recognized a difference between a publicly held corpor-
ation and the family close corporation, and an independent 
body of law has grown up around the close corporation decreasing 
the regulatory and strict construction of corporation law as 
applied to close corporation. Utah has recognized the family 
or close corporation as is evidenced in Peterson vs. Holgren 
Land and Livestock Co., 12 Ut. 2d 125, ^ 63 P. 2d 786 (1961), 
where the Court stated: 
"Even if the minutes of the Board of Directors 
were insufficient to show expressed authori-
zation, the facts that it was a family corpor-
ation in which the father was the president 
and actively engaged in furthering its purposes, 
and the articles of incorporation provided for 
the acquirement and alienation of real property, 
the finding of the court that the contract was 
authorized should be sustained and the ground 
that there was a binding ostensible authority 
in its president." (Underscoring added) 
Again, in Grover vs. Garn, 23 Ut. 2d 44^, 464 P. 2d 598 (1970) , 
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this Court quoting from 19 C.J.S. Corporations §1004, at 
page 471: 
" . . . but the trend of authority is to uphold 
as binding on the corporation acts or contracts 
on its behalf by a person or persons owning all 
or practically all of the stock." (Underscoring 
added) 
With regard to transactions involving interested directors in 
closed corporations, the Minnesota Court in Fountain vs. 
Orech's, Incorporated, 245 Minn. 202, 71 N.W. 2d 646 (1955) 
held that an interested director could be included in deter-
mining whether a quorum was present or not, and there are 
many other cases holding the same. With regard to an interested 
director voting on a matter, Colorado clearly permits the same 
in a closed corporation: 
"Where, as here, the stock of the corporation 
is closely held at the time of the transaction, 
there is no requirement as plaintiffs contend, 
that an independent board of directors approve 
such transaction." Swafford vs. Barry, 152 Colo* 
493, 382 P. ?d 99x (1963) 
The Colorado case, Colorado Management Corporation vs. 
American Founder Life Insurance Co., 359 P. 2d 665, was decided 
in 1961, two years before the Fountain case, and deals with 
a public or regular corporation and not a closed corporation. 
Likewise the cyclopedic authority relied on by the Appellant 
is confined to the public corporations and not to closely 
held corporations. A reading of the cases fails to disclose 
that any of those cases dealt with or urged the closely held 
corporation theory as a basis for exception to the general 
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prevailing public corporation law. In fact in the case of 
Rocket Mining Corporation vs. Rolland J. Gill, 25 Ut. 2d, 
483 P. 2d 897 (1971), the interested directors held no stock 
whatsoever. The public corporation law is intended to control 
the activities of such director for he has nothing to lose. 
The real test in a closely held corporation as is set forth 
in Swafford vs. Barry is that the transaction must be accompanied 
by a full and fair disclosure of the material facts and must 
not be attended with unfairness and fraud. The material 
facts of this transaction were disclosed. The corporation 
claimed fraud but the Lower Court did n0t find evidence of 
fraud and none is alleged on appeal. The Court did find that 
the purchasers, at the time of making tjie offer, did believe 
that $250,000.00 was the reasonable and fair market value for 
the trailer court and were unaware of and had no knowledge of 
any offer by a third party. (Finding of Fact #15) 
The Earnest Money Agreement is valid and enforceable. 
POINT II 
THE TRANSACTIONS OF INTERESTED DIRECTORS ARE NOT 
NECESSARILY VOID OR VOIDABLE. 
The Appellant's Brief acknowledges this rule of law by 
quoting from Branch vs. Western Factors, Inc., 2 8 Ut. 2d 361, 
502 P. 2d 570 (1972) that a contract made by a corporation 
with its officers is not void per se ". . . but at most void-
able within a reasonable time." The Branch case also states 
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that "a director occupies a fiduciary relationship to his 
corporation and his personal dealings with the corporation 
may be voided unless good faith and fairness are shown. The 
requirement of good faith is one of long standing with this 
Court. Sweeney vs. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Ut. 2d 113, 417 P. 
2d. 126 (1968), Mclntyre vs. Ajax Mining Co., 28 Ut. 171, 77 
P. 613 (1904), Runswick et al vs. Floor et al, 116 Ut. 191, 
208 P. 2d 948 (1949). Appellantfs Brief does not really 
attack the "good faith" issue, and Finding of Fact #15 shows 
good faith on behalf of Housley and Brinton. 
As pertains to the "fairness" issue, the duty and burden 
of proof is upon the director to show fciirness only after the 
corporation has raised the question of fairness in its plead-
ings so that the issues and points therein may be fairly met. 
The Defendant did not raise the question of "fairness" below, 
but only in the sense of Housley and Brinton taking advantage 
of corporate opportunity. The corporation now seeks to raise 
for the first time another and different item of fairness, 
namely, that the $250,000.00 purchase price is unfair. This 
Court has many times pointed out the f ruitlessness of an attempt 
to shift theory and position on appeal. 
" . . . Having by his own pleadings, evidence, and 
instructions tried and rested the case upon the 
theory that the mother's negligence would bar 
the father, he is bound thereby, as the law of the 
case. He cannot now on appeal shift his theory 
and position." Pettingill vs. Perkins, 2 Ut. 2d 
266, 272 P. 2d 185 (1954) and cases cited therein. 
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Assuming for the sake of analysis that the question 
of "fairness" had been properly raised at trial, the evidence 
showed the transaction to be fair. In quch cases this Court 
has often looked to the facts in a particular case. Here, 
for over ten years this corporation wanted to sell the trailer 
court and distribute the proceeds; the directors were aware 
of a zoning problem with regard to the property; (T. 436) the 
terms of the sale were cash permitting the distributing of 
the money and ending of the corporation, a desired end; (T. 469) 
by signing the agreement 80% of the stockholders acknowledged 
the contract was fair and ratified it; a prior tax valuation 
in 1969 or 1970 set the common stock at the value of $18,000.00 
per share; (T. 471) the $250,000.00 purchase price, after 
expenses and payment off of the preferred 2,500 shares of stock, 
par value of $10.00 per share, would have resulted in cash 
distribution of approximately $20,000.00 per share of common 
stock; (Finding of Fact #18) the corporation had never had 
a written offer notwithstanding its long efforts to sell the 
property; Housley and Brinton would not have shared in the 
cash; and the loan arranged for in the amount of $187,000.00 
was a standard commercial loan and represented 75% of the 
value of the property and even then there was a requirement 
by the bank of a co-signer. It is clear that even though the 
Defendant corporation failed to raise the purchase price as 
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being an item of claimed unfairness, an examination of the 
facts reveal that the purchase price was indeed fair. 
The Defendant relies on the Runswick case and quotes 
therefrom, and then goes on to attack the validity of a quorum 
of the board. This issue has already been met in Point I. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT 
EXHIBITS D-9 AND D-10. 
Testimony relating to Exhibit D-9, an Earnest Money 
Agreement dated March 15, 1974, by and between the two inter-
ested directors as sellers and Hugh Wayman, an outsider, as 
purchaser, was found inadmissible because it was improper 
cross-examination.(T. 374) Appellant's Brief fails to attack 
this Court ruling. 
The Defendant then again offered Exhibit D-9 for a 
particular purpose as stated by its attorney: 
111 claim, Your Honor, this is taking 
advantage of a corporation opportunity." 
(T. 492-3) 
The Court correctly ruled Exhibit D-9 as being immaterial as 
there was no evidence of Housley and Brinton taking advantage 
of any corporate opportunity. That evidence did not exist 
at the time the exhibit was offered nor did it come about 
thereafter as is reflected in the Court's Finding of Fact #5 
which is not attacked by the Defendant. 
Corporate opportunity is defined in 19 Am Jur 2d 720, 
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Corporations §1311/ as follows: 
"A corporate officer or director is under a 
fiduciary obligation not to divert a cor-
porate business opportunity for his own 
personal gain. The rule as supported by a 
number of cases is that if there is presented 
to a corporate officer or director a business 
opportunity which the corporation is financially 
able to undertake, which is, from its nature, 
in line of the corporation's business and is 
a practical advantage to it, and which is one 
in which the corporation has an interest or 
reasonable expectancy, and if, by embracing 
the opportunity, the self-interest of the 
officer or director will be brought into con-
flict with that of the corporation, the law 
will not permit him to seize the opportunity 
for himself. If he does the corporation may 
claim the benefit of the transaction. . . The 
doctrine charges the interest acquired by an 
officer or director of a corporation in vio-
lation of his duty with a trust for the benefit 
of the corporation." 
Housley and Brinton at the time of making their offer to the 
corporation believed that the $250,000.00 offer was a reasonable 
and fair market value for the trailer court and were unaware 
of and had no knowledge of any offer by a third party or 
parties to purchase the trailer park for a sum in excess of 
the offer which they made. Further, Exhibit D-9 was never 
offered to show market value or unfairness of the purchase price, 
but only to pursue the corporation's claim of corporate opportun-
ity. Appellant failed to show the existence of any outstanding 
corporate opportunity at the time the transaction was entered 
into with Housley and Brinton. 
Exhibit D-10 is an Earnest Money Offer which was never 
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accepted by the corporation, and dated April 11, 1974, from 
a third party to the corporation. In pursuing the corporation's 
theory of Housley and Brinton taking advantage of corporate 
opportunity, the exhibit was offered to show the market value 
of the trailer court. Since the offer was never accepted, the 
Court correctly excluded it. 
"The pronounced tendency of most of the courts 
which have dealt with the matter has been to 
rule against the admissibility upon the issue 
of the market value of the real property as 
evidence as to mere unaccepted offers to purchase." 
(Annotation 7 ALR 2d 784, §2 entitled Unaccepted 
Offer for Purchase or Sale of Real Property as 
Evidence of Value) 
The Sweeney case cited by the corporation is not 
applicable since it deals with an actual sale rather than an 
offer to purchase. In the St. Joe Paper Company vs. United 
States, 155 Fed. 2d 93, Flor. (1964) the Court examined the 
reason behind the general rule of not allowing offers to estab-
lish market value and stated: 
" . . . the amount for which an owner could have 
sold his property or which a prospective pur-
chaser might have been willing to pay'is influenced 
by too many fortuitous circumstances to be revelant 
on the inquiry of value to be admissible as sub-
stantive proof thereof by the owner in a condem-
nation proceeding.1" 
Further, Exhibit D-10 is inadmissible under the heresay 
rule as the offer was tendered in order to show the truth of 
the matter stated therein, namely, valuation of the property. 
The offeror was not a party to this lawsuit, nor was he a 
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witness; nor was it shown that he had an expertise as to 
valuation of property. 
Exhibits D-9 and D-10 were properly excluded. Interest-
ingly enough the remedy, as noted above, available for taking 
advantage of corporate opportunity results in a trust of the 
benefits or advantages for the corporation. The Appellant 
has never sought the remedy, but uses the doctrine of corpor-
ate opportunity as a basis for the corporation's refusal to 
complete the sale of the trailer park. 
POINT IV 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 16-10-74, U.A.C. 1953, AS 
AMENDED, WAS COMPLIED WITH OR WAS NOT APPLICABLE. 
This statute is limited to the sale of all of the 
property and assets of the corporation, if not made in the 
"usual and regular course of its business." The sale in this 
case was made in the usual course of the corporation's business. 
The facts of this case reveal that for at least ten years the 
corporation had two purposes or objects. One was to sell the 
trailer park and to liquidate and distribute the monies resulting 
therefrom. The second object was to manage the trailer park 
for such period of time as it may be necessary to obtain the 
sale and distribution. The corporation for at least ten years 
had so acted with this duel purpose in mind. (Finding of Fact #4) 
Thus, the Appellant corporation was not unlike the corporation 
which is created for the purpose of managing and disposing of 
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a particular estate or property. In Jeppi vs. Brockman Holding 
Co., 34 Cal. 2d (Adv. 10), 206 P. 2d 847, 9 ALR 2d 1297 (1949) it 
involved a corporation which was formed for such purpose and 
construed a similar statute as not prohibiting the sale even 
of all its corporate property if in fact such sale achieves 
its goals and purposes. (See Annotation 9 ALR 2d 1306, Sale 
of Corporate Assets.) 
There is a split of authority as to who may assert the 
invalidity of a sale based upon a statute of this kind. The 
various holdings are discussed in Annotation 58 ALR 2d 784, 
Disposal of Property. It seems clear that this type of statute 
was enacted for the protection of the shareholders, and the 
general rule is that shareholders alone have the right to enforce 
the statute's requirements. At Page 793 of the Annotation 
it is stated: 
"A statute of this type under consideration 
being for the sole benefit of the shareholders, 
is ordinarily held that the corporation itself 
has no standing to allege the invalidity of the 
transfer of its property executed without the 
consent required by statute of its stockholders. . ." 
Our own statute must be read in light of the following section, 
namely, 16-10-75, which confers upon the "shareholder" the 
right to dissent and take appropriate action. This Court in 
Ubeva Mines vs. Toledo Mining Co., 24 Ut. 2d 351, 471 P. 2d 
867 (1970), has held that Section 74 inures to the benefit of 
the shareholders and must be asserted by them. 
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Failure of the shareholders to assert this statute 
within one year impliedly waives their rights. Further, all 
ten stockholders were parties Defendant to this lawsuit as 
originally filed and none of them raised the statute or the 
benefits thereunder as a defense. In fact all of them agreed 
to be dismissed out of the lawsuit with prejudice, and thereby 
again waived their rights under the statute. In addition, 
the shareholders waived their right under the statute by virtue 
of Article X of the corporation's Articles of Incorporation 
which state that: "The Board of Directors by resolution have 
power to sell. . . the property of this corporation without 
consent, ratification or approval of the stockholders." 
The Grover case appears to be controlling in this case. 
It follows the line of reasoning that where the owners of 
substantially all of the shares of authprized stock enter 
into a contract, the contract becomes binding upon the cor-
poration even though the formal requirements of the statute 
have not been met. The Grover case involved a family corporation 
with the husband and wife owning 90% of the shares and being 
directors of the corporation. They entered into a contract 
on behalf of the corporation for the sale of real property 
and the primary asset of the corporation. The contract was 
never formally ratified by the remaining stockholders. This 
Court held that the failure to obtain th£ shareholders' formal 
ratification did not destroy the contract. Further, this 
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Court recognized that: 
" . . . trend of authority is to uphold as 
binding upon the corporation acts or contracts 
on its behalf by a person or persons owning all 
or practically all of the stock." (Utah 
Citation, Page 446) 
The corporation's attempt to distinguish Grover by claiming 
that the holding was based upon a finding that the corporation 
in that case was a sham corporation. Such is not the case. 
This Court actually reversed the Trial Court's ruling of 
personal liability of the shareholders of the corporate con-
tract, and recognized the validity of the corporation. 
Section 16-10-74 of our Code is not a bar to this 
transaction. 
POINT V 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN AWARDING INTEREST OF 6% 
PER ANNUM ON PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S FEES FROM APRIL 10, 1974, 
UNTIL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT? 
This issue does not affect the position of the Cross-
Complainants - Respondents Housley and Brinton and therefore 
no position is taken. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully requested that this Court uphold 
the judgment of the Trial Court as pertains to the Respondents 
Housley and Brinton, and that the Defendant corporation 
specifically perform the agreement. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BHMD & .BELL 1 
^.IRichard Bell 
/303 East 2100 South 
vSaftt Lake City, Utah 84115 
-18- Attorneys for Respondents 
Housley and Brinton 
